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What is Future-Proof Science? 
--- 
1. Science and scepticism  
This book is about identifying scientific claims we can be confident will last forever. By ‘forever’ I mean 
so long as the human race continues, and assuming the scientific endeavour continues in a serious 
way, without some sort of apocalypse. For most purposes it is convenient to think ahead just 1000 
years. A lot has happened in the development of human thought in the past 1000 years, needless to 
say. But I want to claim, and I want to argue, that some of our current ideas will still be with us in 1000 
years, so long as the human race persists and that thing we call ‘science’ is not abolished by some well-
meaning government body. This will strike many readers as hubristic, no doubt. It may well be asked, 
“Who could dare to claim to know the minds of humankind 1000 years from now?” But a persuasive 
argument can be made, I believe, that many such scientific ideas can be identified, and so I hope to 
persuade many of those readers with a genuinely open mind, including those who start reading this 
book with a certain degree of scepticism. I agree that it is surprising – amazing, even – that we can 
rationally be confident that certain scientific ideas will remain intact 1000 years from now. Or even 
5000 years from now. But in fact this is a reasonable thing to believe. 
There are (at least) two very different reasons a scientific idea could last forever: 
(i) We are stuck in a rut of human thinking out of which we will never escape. Our idea is 
totally wrong (or mostly wrong) but we are somehow prevented from seeing that, or even 
if we do see it we are unable to replace it with something better/truer. 
(ii) Science has hit upon the truth, and all that remains is for scientists to build upon and 
develop the correct idea they already have. No feasible scientific developments could 
bring them to reject the idea. 
It is the latter option, (ii), that I mean to refer to with the phrase ‘future-proof science’. This isn’t to 
say that (i) is impossible, and we’ll take it quite seriously in some later chapters. But what I mainly 
wish to argue is that some scientific ideas should be called ‘facts’, and they should be called ‘facts’ 
because they are true ideas – the universe really is the way the theory says it is (allowing for small 
adjustments). Moreover, we have overwhelming evidence for this, to such an extent that no feasible 
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scientific developments could overturn it. For example, it couldn’t ever be the case that we have the 
right idea, and lots of evidence, but somehow (by sheer bad luck perhaps?) we go on to accumulate 
lots of contrary evidence that is sufficient to overturn the correct idea we started with. 
 In short, this book argues that we have come to know things through science, beyond all 
reasonable doubt. Certain knowledge claims – the product of scientific labour – are justified, where 
by ‘knowledge claims’ I mean assertions of fact without any significant hedging or caveats. I hope even 
sceptics will grant that this is possible. Sometimes we can have knowledge where we didn’t have it 
before. To give an example, we can come to know why the sky does not run out of rain. Further, it can 
be the case that we don’t just have a theory about the rain, but that, over time, we have so much 
evidence for the ‘water cycle theory’ that it is not unreasonable to say that we are certain, and it is a 
fact. We stop talking about ‘the water cycle theory’, and simply talk about ‘the water cycle’. If we meet 
a sceptic, it would not be unreasonable (though it may come across as patronising or arrogant) to say, 
“I’m certain; I know that I’m right about this.” Of course, in social interactions it is often much 
preferred to ‘agree to disagree’, to respect somebody’s opinions and beliefs. It is often much preferred 
to dial down one’s confidence and say something like “I think there’s good evidence for this”, as 
opposed to “I know this is true”. But what may seem like objectionable hubris to your audience can 
sometimes be fully justified: it may be no exaggeration to say that you are sure (beyond reasonable 
doubt) that you are correct, and an alternative view is wrong, however uncomfortable it may feel to 
say this.1  
I think it’s worth expanding on this point about social discomfort a little further. In many cases we 
face difficult dilemmas vis-à-vis how we express our degree of confidence. For example, suppose you 
visit a music festival, and you’re laid on the grass one evening staring up at the stars with a new friend. 
You hear them say, “I guess we’ll never know what those twinkly dots of light really are”. You might 
feel so awkward about contradicting your new friend, that you actually reply, “Yeah, I guess not”, even 
though (let’s assume) you studied astrophysics at university, and feel 100% sure that scientists do 
know what stars are. The problem is, you just can’t think of any way to contradict the person without 
coming across as patronising. It also doesn’t really matter if you ‘let it go’ in this particular context. 
In other contexts, this tendency to ‘let it go’ or ‘agree to disagree’ absolutely must be resisted. 
Sometimes it is crucially important to distinguish clearly between items of human knowledge, and 
issues that are unsettled and open for discussion, without hiding that distinction behind social niceties. 
If we swap the musical festival example for the Covid-19 pandemic, and we swap the statement for “I 
                                                          
1 The concept of future-proof science is not inconsistent with ‘epistemic humility’; see e.g. Kidd (2020) for a useful entry to 
the literature on humility and science. 
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guess we just can’t know whether the AstraZeneca vaccine is safe”, it becomes far more important to 
respond honestly instead of simply answering “Yes, you might be right about that”, or similar. Indeed, 
if you know a lot of about vaccine testing, it would be wrong not to challenge the statement; you might 
even end up saving the person’s life. And in science generally there are plenty of high-stakes contexts 
where absolute honesty is paramount, and social niceties must be put to one side. To illustrate: 
scientists could not ‘agree to disagree’ with CFC companies in the 1980s on the question whether CFCs 
were causing ozone depletion. If scientists had agreed with the CFC companies that they couldn’t 
really prove the link between CFCs and ozone, and didn’t really know, and there was room for rational 
doubt, that would have been a death sentence – at the hand of skin cancer – for thousands of 
individuals who are alive today. A similar story can be told about the HIV-AIDS link (Godfrey-Smith 
2021, pp. 311-2), and there were indeed many unnecessary deaths in this case – this isn’t all merely 
hypothetical. 
 At the same time there is of course a sense in which we are never 100% certain; a certain degree 
of doubt is always possible. Suppose I strike the keys of the laptop and I say to myself, “Do I really 
know I am typing right now? Do I really know that I am attempting to write the opening chapter of a 
book?” It’s certainly possible that I am wrong. For example (as Descartes famously urged in the 17th 
century) I could be having the most vivid dream I’ve ever had. Or perhaps I am not asleep, but my 
senses – sight, sound, touch – are being manipulated in a way that is totally hidden from me (as in The 
Matrix). Or perhaps (back with Descartes again) even my thoughts are being manipulated, by some 
‘evil demon’ or similar powerful being. 
 If we accept that these are (remote) possibilities, even for a case as rudimentary as whether I know 
that I am striking keys on my laptop, then it may be urged that I shouldn’t say I am sure. I shouldn’t 
say I am certain. At least not 100%. And if not for everyday facts such as this, then definitely not for 
scientific ideas – such as the causal link between CFCs and ozone depletion – which are much further 
removed from everyday experience and the testimony of the senses. The problem with taking this line 
should be obvious however: if it is insisted that we aren’t sure about scientific ideas on these grounds, 
then we have to accept that we are never sure about anything. In which case words such as ‘fact’, 
‘sure’, and ‘certain’ are never applicable, and might as well be eradicated from the dictionary: 
“Knowledge is impossible!” 
 In fact, those who urge scepticism about scientific ideas are usually absolutely clear that they are 
not ‘radical’ or ‘global’ sceptics. As Hoefer (2020, p. 24) writes, 
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As philosophers of science we are entitled (and, I would say, obliged) to set aside radical skeptical 
doubts. Or to put it another way: once the scientific realist forces the anti-realist into positing 
radical skeptical scenarios in order to keep her anti-realist doubts alive, the game is over. 
Thus scientific sceptics think it is reasonable to say that we know lots of things, especially everyday 
things such as that it is raining outside. Of course, we might be mistaken, and the drops on the window 
have come from the window cleaner. We might even be right, but for the wrong reason: it is raining 
outside, but the drops on the window that we used as evidence for our claim that it is raining outside 
actually came from the window cleaner – these are the ‘Gettier’ cases. But it is reasonable to say that 
we know when we have been sufficiently careful with our observations (e.g. we go outside and stand 
in the rain for five minutes). And this stands, even though it always remains remotely possible that we 
are asleep or are somehow being manipulated or otherwise deceived. As Van Fraassen (1980, p. 71) 
notes, “we do in our daily life infer, or at least arrive at, conclusions that go beyond the evidence we 
have”, and he is keen to hold on to such everyday conclusions: “I must at least defend myself against 
this threatened [global] scepticism” (ibid.). 
 What sceptics wish to deny is that we can have a similar level of confidence in properly scientific 
ideas. Witness, for example, Brad Wray, who (clearly inspired by Van Fraassen) writes in his 2018 book 
Resisting Scientific Realism: 
 
I will argue that our current best [scientific] theories are quite likely going to be replaced 
in the future by theories that make significantly different ontological assumptions. (p. 1) 
I argue that there is reason to believe that many of our best theories are apt to be 
rendered obsolete in the future. (p. 2) 
We should not get too attached to our theories. (p. 65) 
Today’s theories are as likely to be replaced in the future as were the successful theories 
of the past. (p. 65) 
[C]ontemporary scientists should expect that their scientific offspring will look back at 
their theories with the same attitude they have towards the theories of their 
predecessors. Their offspring [future scientists] will see that many of today’s successful 
theories will have been discarded and replaced by new theories that today’s scientists 
never even entertained accepting, theories that are currently unconceived. (p. 95) 
 
These claims are purely concerned with science, and – just like Van Fraassen before him – Wray is 
clear (e.g. p. 43f. and p. 64) that he is not a ‘radical’ or ‘global’ sceptic. He has specific reasons for 
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maintaining his scepticism about science whilst resisting scepticism in many contexts outside of 
science. Every scientific sceptic, or ‘anti-realist’, has to deal with this issue: where does their scepticism 
end? Under what circumstances, exactly, are they not sceptical? (See e.g. Stanford 2006, pp. 12-13.) 
 Naturally there is no absolute dividing line between scientific claims and other types of claim. It is 
not as if we reach scientific claims in one way – using the ‘scientific method’, say – and reach other 
claims in a completely different way. Wray and other scientific sceptics acknowledge that there is no 
clear dividing line, but this presents no problem for them: there can be a grey area and at the same 
time still be clear cases on either side. Sceptics argue that (many/most/all) claims on the scientific side 
are not secure, and we shouldn’t make bold assertions about them (e.g. that they will still be in place 
in 1000 years). Claims on the other side of the divide may well be absolutely fine, and we might make 
bold assertions about them, even though it isn’t totally impossible that we are dreaming, or our brain 
is wired up to a sophisticated alien computer. 
 By contrast, this book will argue that this is not the way to carve up what (not) to be sceptical 
about. The fact that an idea comes out of science definitely does not mean that we can’t be just as 
sure about it as we can about many everyday things. The evidence for scientific claims can sometimes 
take a form quite unlike the evidence we have for more everyday claims, but that needn’t block our 
ability to know things. Indeed, often scientific evidence can be better – for the purposes of making 
claims concerning what we know – than more ‘everyday evidence’. Simply put, the scientific 
provenance of an idea has no bearing on how certain we can be about the future-proofness of that 
idea. Instead of looking at the provenance, we should look (directly, or perhaps indirectly) at the 
quantity and quality of evidence. And there are circumstances in which we can be sure that the 
evidence has crossed some threshold, such that it is no longer reasonable to remain sceptical about 
the underlying idea. There is no exact threshold, of course, and there will always be a time when the 
scientific community is split, with some (a significant percentage) willing to state that the evidence is 
in, and we should start using the word ‘fact’, and others (a significant percentage) insisting that we 
need to remain cautious about any such bold claims (see Chapter 7 for a contemporary example). But, 
sometimes, we get beyond that stage, and reach a time when at least 95% of reasonable/relevant 
scientists are happy to use the word ‘fact’. (The use of ‘95%’ will be justified in due course.) 
And, indeed, scientists sometimes want to make this point themselves. A highly respected 
National Academies Press publication contains the following: 
[M]any scientific explanations have been so thoroughly tested that they are very unlikely to 
change in substantial ways as new observations are made or new experiments are analyzed. 
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These explanations are accepted by scientists as being true and factual descriptions of the 
natural world. The atomic structure of matter, the genetic basis of heredity, the circulation of 
blood, gravitation and planetary motion, and the process of biological evolution by natural 
selection are just a few examples of a very large number of scientific explanations that have 
been overwhelmingly substantiated. (Institute of Medicine 2008, p. 12) 
In fact, some of the examples in this passage are better than others (as will be discussed in due course), 
but the basic point is clear: there are definite cases where science has defeated the sceptic. Future-
proof science is a reality, not just a pipe dream. 
 
2. Misleading evidence 
Can scientific evidence be highly misleading? Can it be the case that the evidence looks extremely 
strong, to the extent that nearly all scientists want to use the word ‘fact’, but that’s only because the 
evidence has led them up the garden path? Certainly some have claimed this, citing examples from 
the history of science to support the claim. Alas, to my embarrassment, I have also said something far 
too close to this. In 2018 Stephen Harris at The Conversation got in touch with the philosophy of 
science group at Durham, looking for somebody to write an article on “the biggest failed science 
projects”. This ultimately led to my article ‘The Misleading Evidence that Fooled Scientists for 
Decades’, published in June 2018 (Vickers 2018b), where I wrote “history shows us that even very 
strong evidence can be misleading”. 
This book will argue that, in the contemporary scientific world, evidence can never be all that 
misleading. At least, not if one is careful about it, as the scientific community always is in the fullness 
of time (so this book will argue). One of the primary examples in my 2018 article was something of a 
mistake, and I’ll correct that mistake in Chapter 3 of this book. What I said in that article was not totally 
wrong(!) – it can be the case that one or two pieces of evidence can be very misleading, taken on their 
own, although even then the words ‘fooled scientists for decades’ are not warranted. Better would be 
‘fooled scientists temporarily’, or ‘fooled a few scientists, but not the whole scientific community’. The 
most obvious cases are those where an individual piece of evidence was very surprising, and perhaps 
had the potential to mislead the scientific community, but didn’t. Crucially, scientists consider a whole 
body of evidence over a period of time; they are (usually) in no rush to make a knee-jerk reaction to 
an individual result. And it is vanishingly rare for a whole body of evidence to be misleading over a 
substantial period of time, at least in the contemporary scientific world, where there are so many 
scientists and so many different scientific teams ready to correct the mistakes, fallacies, unwarranted 
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inferences, and exaggerations of one individual scientist or team of scientists. Thank goodness I did at 
least say, in the final paragraph of my ‘Misleading Evidence’ article, “It’s rare for evidence to be very 
misleading”. But this wasn’t strong enough: a whole body of evidence is never ‘very misleading’ for a 
substantial period of time, and for a large enough, diverse enough, scientific community. 
I have been talking about evidence as if it is one thing, but in fact ‘evidence’ is something of an 
umbrella term: evidence takes many different forms, in different contexts, and its quality and quantity 
can sometimes be very difficult to assess. I agree with Kyle Stanford (2011) when he writes that, 
“Scientific confirmation is a heterogeneous and many-splendored thing; let us count ourselves lucky 
to find it – in all its genuine diversity – wherever and whenever we can.” (p. 898). Evidential reasoning 
– in all its forms – cannot be represented by a single, simple equation, as the Bayesian model of 
confirmation would suggest. Much energy has been spent debating empirical evidence, most 
obviously evidence taking the form of accommodations and predictions of phenomena. But it is 
sensible, I submit, to use the word ‘evidence’ in a broader sense: we can have (good!) reasons for 
believing claims that are not straight-forwardly empirical reasons. Evidence can sometimes take the 
form of an argument, for example. And evidence can sometimes come under headings such as 
‘consistency’, ‘coherence’, and ‘explanatory power’: these are the so-called non-empirical theoretical 
virtues (see Schindler 2018 for a recent treatment). The intense focus (within academic literature) on 
successful predictions in recent decades is justified to a certain extent, since successful predictions can 
sometimes be very important individual pieces of evidence. But even several successful predictions 
can be overwhelmed by other considerations. How we weigh up all these different sources of evidence 
is far from obvious. Scientists on the ground often use their intuitions, and these intuitions are often 
quite reliable, though not always. My claim is not that we can come up with a formula for ‘the weight 
of evidence’ in a given case; far from it. My claim is merely that sometimes we are sure that the weight 
of evidence has crossed a threshold, and it is time to drop the word ‘theory’, and start using the word 
‘fact’. 
When it comes to misleading evidence, it undoubtedly exists. But it exists just as much for 
everyday claims as scientific claims. Sherlock Holmes can be misled for a while, as all of the evidence 
seems to point to one guilty party, when in the end the culprit is somebody else. In fact, a huge number 
of books and films play on this kind of possibility. Very occasionally, evidence can be highly misleading 
in everyday life, as the world seems to conspire against us somehow. Rarely, somebody is out to 
deceive us, as Iago deceives Othello: Othello has good evidence that Desdemona is having an affair 
with Cassio, even though she is not. We can also imagine still greater deceptions which have nothing 
to do with science: e.g. how the producers deceive Truman Burbank in The Truman Show. In this case, 
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Truman has extremely strong evidence for all kinds of things that are not actual – what he sees on the 
news is fictional, and all those around him know that it is, but act as if it isn’t. 
The senses can be thoroughly misled, too, even if they are incredibly reliable most of the time. I’m 
not talking about the way we seem to ‘see’ or ‘feel’ things in a dream – if that is misleading at all, it is 
an ephemeral deception, since we know it wasn’t real as soon as we wake up. The senses can be 
misled more dramatically, for example when we fail to see the left-to-right lines in Figure (1a) as 
parallel, horizontal lines. Or more dramatically still, we see the world very vividly as coloured, when it 




Fig. 1(a) The left-to-right lines are actually parallel, and horizontal (check them!). Credit: 
Sylverarts Vectors, Shutterstock. 
 
 
Fig. 1(b): Strawberries are (almost certainly) not coloured in the way they straight-
forwardly appear. (Public domain) 
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The colour illusion is particularly dramatic, because we can’t reveal the illusion to ourselves as we 
can with the horizontal lines in (1a). Indeed, for thousands of years the human race was certain that 
the world is genuinely coloured, with only rare voices of (speculative) dissent. It was only with the rise 
of modern philosophy (the primary/secondary quality distinction), developments in physics (What are 
surfaces made of? What properties do they have?), and developments in psychology and 
neuroscience, that evidence gradually mounted that when it comes to colour, the world is not how it 
appears. So in fact, if one is looking for real cases of highly misleading evidence, for a whole 
community, over a long period of time, the best examples may come from outside science, and belong 
instead to the context where the scientific sceptics are not sceptical: everyday claims such as ‘snow is 
white’. 
 As the book progresses we will look at various candidates for misleading evidence in the history 
of science. Numerous examples have now been put forward in the literature, cases where scientists 
were apparently fooled, and later had to change their minds. I will argue that such cases are not 
grounds for a strong form of scepticism, and leave open the possibility that we can identify many 
scientific ideas that are future-proof. Many contemporary scientific ideas will be excluded from this, 
of course, precisely because we have not crossed the evidence threshold yet (and we may never cross 
it). For one thing, even if the initial evidence looks good, it is prudent to reserve judgement until an 
idea has been rigorously tested. This has never been more obvious than with the recent ‘replication 
crisis’, where many results in psychology/medicine/social sciences, apparently based on statistically 
significant data, cannot be reliably replicated. The crisis shows clearly that sometimes judgements of 
the weight of evidence can initially be exaggerated, even by honest, professional scientists. But this is 
hardly evidence for the kind of scepticism this book is concerned with: it didn’t take long for the 
scientific community to attempt replications of these studies, see those replications fail, and recognise 
that certain initial claims of ‘strong evidence’ had been exaggerated. The international scientific 
community wasn’t for a moment tempted to form a consensus, or make an official knowledge claim, 
regarding these cases. Needless to say, examples of future-proof science identified in this book will be 
based on much stronger evidence than the cases at issue in the replication crisis. 
 
3. Approximate truth  
Another important caveat before we really get started: I don’t deny that there will be adjustments to 
scientific ideas in the future. Just about any scientific idea one can imagine will be subject to some 
kind of refinement over the next tens/hundreds of years. What I’m most concerned to resist, however, 
are claims that our current best scientific theories will be ‘discarded’ or ‘rendered obsolete’, as stated 
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in the Wray (2018) quotations given above. Similarly, I’m keen to resist the claim, often made by the 
sceptic, that future scientists will take ‘the same attitude’ towards our current theories that we take 
towards past discarded theories, and that “our own scientific theories are held to be as much subject 
to radical conceptual change as our past theories are seen to be.” (Hesse 1976, p. 266). 
 To illustrate, consider models of our Solar System. One way to think about the history of such 
models is as follows. Ptolemy got it wrong: the Sun does not orbit the Earth – this idea was eventually 
discarded. Then Copernicus got it wrong: the Earth does not orbit the Sun in circular orbits. Then 
Kepler got it wrong: The Earth does not orbit the Sun in elliptical orbits. The latter idea is wrong, for 
example because the Earth’s orbit is always perturbed by other bodies, such as Jupiter, but also 
because it assumes that the Sun’s position is fixed, when it is not. Then the 19th-century Newtonians 
got it wrong, too: The Earth does not orbit the centre of gravity of the Earth-Sun system in a near-
ellipse according to Newton’s laws of motion. Einstein’s general theory of relativity changed all that. 
And now it is widely assumed that Einstein’s theory of general relativity needs to be quantized, 
somehow; this is what theories such as ‘loop quantum gravity’ are about. So we’ve been wrong wrong 
wrong. Each theory has been ‘discarded’, and along the way we’ve seen ‘radical change’ again and 
again, and we expect more. 
 Or have we? As I said, this is one way to think about the history of scientific thought vis-à-vis the 
Solar System. But it is contrived. Describing this sequence of theories in terms of repeated ‘radical 
change’ is misleading. Consider Newtonians such as Laplace, Poisson, and Le Verrier – specialising in 
celestial mechanics in the 18th and 19th centuries – faced with a philosopher of science saying, 
[C]ontemporary scientists should expect that their scientific offspring will look back at their 
theories with the same attitude they have towards the theories of their predecessors. (Wray 
2018, p. 95) 
Well, is this correct? Were those 19th century Newtonian models of the Solar System just as subject to 
‘radical change’ as the epicycle model of Ptolemy, including as it did a static Earth, with all other 
celestial bodies orbiting around it? Definitely not. Ptolemy’s model of the Solar System was indeed 
radically false, in a large number of different ways – one cannot possibly shoehorn the term 
‘approximately true’ onto this model. By contrast, the model Le Verrier was working with in the 19th 
century was exceedingly accurate. Contemporary scientists do not look back on Le Verrier’s model 
with anything like ‘the same attitude’ that Le Verrier looked back on Ptolemy’s model. And this is 
because – to put it bluntly – Le Verrier’s model was approximately true. Absolutely no need for a 
shoehorn. 
Peter Vickers, Identifying Future-Proof Science                                                      Forthcoming with Oxford University Press 
11 
 
 It may be objected: Le Verrier could never have dreamed that Einstein’s theory of general relativity 
would come along, and completely transform our conceptions of space, time, and the meaning of 
‘gravity’. When it comes to space, time, and gravity, Le Verrier’s views were indeed ‘radically false’, 
and eventually ‘discarded’ (at least as candidates for truth). But this is to shift the goalposts. We were 
talking about models of the Solar System, including what the Sun, the Moon, and the planets are, and 
how they relate to each other and interact2 with each other over time. When I described Ptolemy’s 
model as ‘radically false’, I was considering these respects, not his views on the nature of space and 
time. It goes without saying that there are always deeper questions one can ask, including, “Is gravity 
a force?” But when it comes to modelling the Solar System one can choose to ignore such deeper 
‘metaphysical’ questions, and get on with the modelling job, exactly as Le Verrier and many others did 
in the 19th century. And when one puts the deeper questions to one side and concentrates on 
assessing the model of the Solar System Le Verrier believed in, it cannot be denied that his model was 
approximately correct. In fact, many of the things he believed were plain true; for example:  
The Earth orbits the centre of gravity of the Earth-Sun system in a near-ellipse, subject to 
minor perturbations. 
If one similarly looks for (significant, non-trivial) truths within the Ptolemaic account, one will struggle. 
 If we turn back to the concept of ‘future-proof science’, then, I do want this to be compatible with 
adjustments. Some of our current ideas will (of course) turn out not to be ‘perfectly’ true, but can 
reasonably be described as approximately true in the straight-forward way that Le Verrier’s 
conception of the Solar System was obviously approximately true. No clever theory of ‘approximate 
truth’ is needed to substantiate this: I will use the term in the same way it is used in everyday life. We 
all handle the concept of approximate truth every single day of our lives, whether we realise it or not.3 
Different cases of application of the term ‘approximately true’ will come up in different contexts, as 
we progress, and as we tackle the case studies, so I won’t say much more here (see e.g. Section 5 of 
Chapter 7). Suffice it to say, for now, that there are often clear cases of approximate truth in science, 
just as in everyday life. I submit that we will always look back on Le Verrier’s model of the Solar System 
as an approximately true model. When I say that a scientific idea is future-proof, I do not mean that it 
won’t change at all for the next 1000 years; I agree that there might be minor adjustments, just as 
there have been minor adjustments to some of Le Verrier’s ideas about the Solar System. At the same 
                                                          
2 How they interact crudely speaking, not at some deep metaphysical level. More on this ‘depth of description’ spectrum in 
due course. 
3 To illustrate: If we go out for dinner, and the waiter turns up to take our order and says, “I’m ready to take your order” 
just as his hand is moving to his waistcoat pocket to retrieve his pad and pen, we will not object, “Actually, you weren’t 
ready when you said that. You’re only ready now, some seconds later, when you’ve actually got your pad and pen in hand.” 
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time, however, some of Le Verrier’s ideas are retained intact, and indeed this is always possible when 
the original ideas are approximately true. When I was looking for a statement from 19th century 
celestial mechanics that was plain true I simply omitted reference to Newtonian mechanics. I also used 
the term ‘near-ellipse’, deliberately staying vague on how the orbit of the Earth varies from a true 
ellipse. Charles S. Peirce famously wrote, “It is easy to be certain ... One has only to be sufficiently 
vague.” What’s crucial here is that one can often be just partially vague, still saying something of 
obvious substance. In this way it is often possible to be practically certain about something highly non-
trivial. 
 
4. Future-proof science 
Which scientific ideas are future-proof? It is not my intention to use this book to provide a 
comprehensive list! But at the same time, I must be willing to step up to the plate and name some 
concrete examples. A good starting point is to provide some singular facts that are scientific in the 
sense that we know them to be facts as a result of scientific labour: 
 
1. The sun is a star.4 
2. The Milky Way is a spiral galaxy, similar in structure to Messier 83 and NGC 6744. 
3. The Earth is a slightly tilted, spinning, oblate spheroid. 
4. The Moon causes the tides (with just a bit of help from other factors, such as the pull of the Sun). 
5. The collection of propositions summarised as ‘The water cycle’. 
6. DNA has a double helix structure. 
7. Red blood cells carry oxygen around the body. 
8. Normal person-to-person speech travels as a longitudinal compression wave through the particles in 
the air. 
 
In these eight cases there can be no reasonable doubt. Indeed, these are such solid facts that any bona 
fide scientist – with relevant specialist knowledge – would find it absurd to add the word ‘theory’ to 
                                                          
4 An anonymous reviewer asked ‘What does this mean? How would you flesh it out?’ (cf. the discussions in Fuller 2007, p. 
10, and also Miller 2013, p. 1302). This same question could be asked of any one of my 30 examples. This issue will be 
addressed in Chapter 9, Section 2.4. (‘Objections and replies’), but the brief answer is that one can use standard textbook 
definitions of key terms that are not super-detailed, but also far from trivial. It is worth reflecting briefly on the fact that 
‘Pluto is a planet’ turned out not to be future-proof. However, Pluto was always an outlier, whereas “our Sun is very much 
a run-of-the-mill star” (Noyes 1982, p. 7). Kinds and outliers will be further discussed in Section 2 of Chapter 8. 
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any one of these examples, e.g. to talk of the ‘Water Cycle Theory’.5 It may be objected that it is 
possible for an astronaut to directly see that the Earth is a spinning spheroid, but of course we knew 
the Earth was spherical long before that was possible (to the extent that it is). And in addition one 
can’t say the same of all of these examples; we don’t directly see that the sun is a star. 
 If we think these are all indisputable facts, but direct observation doesn’t provide the warrant, 
then why do we believe them so strongly? One answer is that we are taught that they are facts at 
school. But if pushed further we may agree that they are taught as facts because scientists have 
established that they are facts, over many decades, using a combination of scientific methods 
including observation, experiment, and theory-development. In short, the evidence for these eight 
claims has gradually built up until no reasonable doubt can be maintained. Very few of us actually 
know more than a very small fraction of the relevant evidence, and here an element of trust inevitably 
enters the picture. But – unless we are conspiracy theorists – we feel that this trust in authority is very 
highly motivated. (See Chapter 5 for a full discussion of the role of trust.) 
 If the given story is accepted, it is difficult to resist sliding a little further. If we accept what is taught 
to us at school as scientific fact – using that as a proxy for a huge amount of scientific evidence built 
up over many decades – then there are many possible examples, including more ambitious examples 
coming more obviously under the heading of ‘scientific theory’. In fact, many such examples were put 
forward in the philosophical literature in the 60s and 70s by those who wished to resist Kuhn’s (1962) 
story of scientific revolutions, to make the point that his examples – exemplifying the cycle of ‘normal 
science’, ‘crisis’, and ‘paradigm change’ – were cherry-picked. As Godfrey-Smith (2003, p. 98) writes, 
 
[Kuhn] was surely too focused on the case of theoretical physics. […] [I]f we look at other parts 
of science – at chemistry and molecular biology, for example – it is much more reasonable to 
see a continuing growth (with some hiccups) in knowledge about how the world really works. 
We see a steady growth in knowledge about the structures of sugars, fats, proteins, and other 
important molecules, for example. There is no evidence that these kinds of results will come 
to be replaced, as opposed to extended, as science moves along. This type of work does not 
concern the most basic features of the universe, but it is undoubtedly science. (original 
emphasis) 
I couldn’t agree more: a large part of our current understanding of sugars, fats, and proteins is surely 
future-proof, even if there remain many open questions about these molecules. And it is not only the 
                                                          
5 Cf. Hoefer (2020), p. 21: “The core intuition behind SR [Scientific Realism] is a feeling that it is absolutely crazy to not 
believe in viruses, DNA, atoms, molecules, tectonic plates, etc.; and in the correctness of at least many of the things we say 
about them.” (original emphasis). This book is not a defence of ‘scientific realism’, however; see Chapter 2. 
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structure of these molecules that we can claim knowledge of; we also understand a great deal about 
how they behave within the bodies of organisms, including human bodies. This is compatible with the 
thought that there remains much we do not understand. 
 Molecular biology is just the tip of the iceberg. Some scholars have countered the list of examples 
of rejected theories in the history of science with a list of examples of ‘theories’ or ‘bodies of thought’ 
that are apparently secure, and where no revolutions are even remotely anticipated. The following is 
a list of my own, building upon the eight examples already given (partly inspired by Fahrbach 2011, p. 
152).6 In each case I include a ‘singular fact’ that is illustrative of a wider body of claims coming under 
the relevant heading: 
 
9. Evolution by natural selection.7 
o Singular fact: Human beings evolved from apes that lived on Earth several million years ago.8 
 
10. Numerous chemical facts about elements and how they relate to each other.9 
o Singular fact: A typical oxygen atom is 16 times heavier than a typical hydrogen atom. 
 
11. The germ theory of disease, including numerous things we know about the properties and behaviour 
of various different bacteria and viruses, and how these sometimes contribute to disease and illness. 
o Singular fact: Syphilis is caused by the bacterium Treponema pallidum subspecies pallidum. 
 
12. The ‘neural net’ theory of the brain, including a large body of knowledge vis-à-vis brain behaviour and 
the nervous system. 
o Singular fact: Visual input coming from the retina is processed at the rear of the brain. 
 
13. Much of cosmology, including the large-scale structure of the universe, the expansion of the universe, 
and the properties of various entities such as quasars, pulsars, and galaxies. 
o Singular fact: Quasars were more common in the early universe. 
 
                                                          
6 Earlier scholars have also sometimes given their own examples of future-proof science (although they don’t use that 
term). For example, McMullin (1984, pp. 27-8) gives examples from evolutionary history, geology, molecular chemistry, 
and cell biology. He also notes (p. 8) that, “Scientists are likely to treat with incredulity the suggestion that constructs such 
as these [galaxies, genes, and molecules] are no more than convenient ways of organizing the data obtained from 
sophisticated instruments.” More recently, Hoefer (2020, p. 22) writes, “There is a large swath of established 
scientific knowledge that we now possess which includes significant parts of microbiology, chemistry, electricity and 
electronics (understood as not fundamental), geology, natural history (the fact of evolution by natural selection and much 
coarse-grained knowledge of the history of living things on Earth), and so forth. It seems crazy to think that any of this lore 
could be entirely mistaken, radically wrong in the way that phlogiston theories and theories of the solid mechanical aether 
were wrong.” (original emphasis). See also Hoefer (2020, p. 25f.) and Hoefer and Martί (2020). 
7 This will be tackled in Chapter 4. Of course, nobody would claim that natural selection is the only active mechanism. 
8 To get a sense of the state of the art, see, e.g., Williams (2018), Böhme et al. (2019), and Almécija et al. (2021). 
9 The periodic table of elements is a tricky example in certain respects, since there are ongoing debates about how best to 
structure it (or at least, how best to structure parts of it); see, e.g., Grochala (2018). 
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14. A large body of thought concerning the geological history of our Earth, including (for example) 
knowledge of past ice ages. 
o Singular fact: Big Rock boulder in Alberta, Canada, was carried there from the Rocky Mountains 
by a glacier during the last ice age. 
 
15. A large body of thought concerning the interior of the Earth, including knowledge of the inner and outer 
core. 
o Singular fact: The Earth has a liquid-metal outer core. 
 
16. A large body of thought concerning the history of life on earth, including the ‘Cambrian explosion’, and 
the P-Tr and K-Pg extinction events. 
o Singular fact: There was an explosion of life on Earth approx. 540 million years ago. 
 
17. Detailed knowledge of the history of human life. 
o Singular fact: There have been several different human-like ‘Homo’ species, of which only 
modern-day Homo sapiens remains. 
 
18. Plate tectonics, including the history of past land-masses such as Laurasia and Gondwana. 
o Singular fact: Between 120 and 160 million years ago, South America split from Africa. 
 
19. Knowledge of cells, mitochondria, chromosomes, and DNA. 
o Singular fact: The SRY gene on the Y chromosome is essential for the development of male 
gonads in humans. 
 
20. Knowledge of the chemical and physical evolution of our Sun over the next six billion years. 
o Singular fact: Our Sun will gradually turn into a red giant over the course of the next six billion 
years. 
 
21. Knowledge coming under the heading of ‘biochemistry’, including knowledge of the structure and 
behaviour (within organisms) of important molecules such as various sugars, fats, proteins, vitamins, 
caffeine, alcohol, etc. 
o Singular fact: Animal cells use glucose and oxygen to produce adenosine triphosphate, a high-
energy molecule that can then provide muscles with energy to contract during exercise. 
 
22. Knowledge of the structure of all kinds of molecules, and chemical reactions between molecules. 
o Singular fact: Vinegar (C2H4O2) and baking soda (NaHCO3) react to give sodium acetate 
(NaC2H3O2) + water (H2O) + carbon dioxide (CO2).10 
 
23. Detailed knowledge of many dinosaurs, including at least some aspects of how they lived and 
interacted. 
                                                          
10 As McMullin (1984, p. 28) notes, “To give a realist construal to the molecular models of the chemist is not to imply that 
the nature of the constituent atoms and of the bonding between them is exhaustively known.” 
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o Singular fact: Tyrannosaurus rex had a highly developed sense of smell. 
 
24. Detailed knowledge of the properties and behaviour of sound waves. 
o Singular fact: Sounds waves are both longitudinal and transverse through solids, but only 
longitudinal through liquid and gas. 
 
25. Knowledge of the properties and behaviour of various different types of cancer. 
o Singular fact: Smoking causes cancer. 
 
26. Knowledge of numerous illnesses and diseases, including Parkinson’s, diabetes, epilepsy, HIV/AIDS, 
Huntingdon’s, spina bifida, etc. 
o Singular fact: Human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV) kill immune system cells (T helper cells). 
 
27. A large body of knowledge within pollen and spore science (palynology). 
o Singular fact: Endospores can stay dormant for millions of years. 
 
28. Thermodynamics. 
o Singular fact: At a constant temperature, the pressure of a gas is inversely proportional to its 
volume. 
 
29. Numerous facts coming under the broad heading of ‘climate science’, including human-caused global 
warming. 
o Singular fact: The concentration of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere in the year 2020 
was the highest it has been in 3 million years. 
 
30. Materials science: our understanding of properties and behaviours of various different metals, alloys, 
plastics, etc, going far beyond purely empirical knowledge. 
o Singular fact: Polycarbonate molecules absorb UV radiation. 
 
So, I think it is quite easy to give 30 examples11, even including some very broad examples which 
actually include within them numerous more-specific scientific facts/theories. Of his list of nine 
examples, Fahrbach writes: “Despite the very strong rise in amount of scientific work, refutations 
among them [“our best scientific theories”] have basically not occurred” (p. 151). The significance of 
the ‘very strong rise in the amount of scientific work’ will be explored in Chapter 2, Chapter 5, and 
elsewhere. 
                                                          
11 There is some overlap in my examples; e.g. examples 2 and 13, and examples 8 and 24. It is no struggle to come up with 
additional examples, however. For example, I haven’t included Hoefer’s (2020) examples concerning (i) our knowledge of 
electrical phenomena (at a non-fundamental level of description), and (ii) nuclear physics, including facts about nuclear 
fusion and fission, and nuclear (in)stability. Throughout this book I will repeatedly refer to ‘the 30 examples from Chapter 
1’, with the thought that any examples that concern the reader could easily be replaced with alternative examples. 
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 Of course, the sceptic will absolutely expect to see a (long) list of ‘current best theories’ that have 
not (yet) been refuted. It is hardly evidence for future-proof science that one can produce a long list 
of current theories concerning which current scientists are confident. Lord Kelvin, at the turn of the 
20th century, reportedly stated that, “There is nothing new to be discovered in physics now. All that 
remains is more and more precise measurement.” And Albert A. Michelson (famed for the Michelson-
Morley experiment of 1887) wrote in 1903: 
The more important fundamental laws and facts of physical science have all been discovered, 
and these are so firmly established that the possibility of their ever being supplanted in 
consequence of new discoveries is exceedingly remote. (Michelson 1903, p. 23f.) 
Given that Kelvin and Michelson said these things, their own lists of examples of ‘future-proof science’ 
would no doubt have included examples of ‘classical’ 19th-century physics that we have now quite 
thoroughly rejected (at least as candidates for truth). So, we have to be careful: the fact that some 
prominent scientists are confident about an idea, or theory, should not by itself convince us that the 
idea is (probably) future-proof. But that’s OK: this isn’t the reason I am confident about the 30 
examples listed above. The reason I am confident has to do with the quantity and the quality of the 
evidence for these ideas, vetted by thousands of scientists, embedded within a sufficiently diverse 
scientific community. 
 That’s the (very) short story. The long story is rather more complicated, and will be filled in 
gradually over the next eight chapters. 
 
5. Outline of the book 
It is time to get stuck into the details of the debate. This we turn to next, in Chapter 2. So far I have 
only sketched the position of the ‘scientific sceptic’, and there are importantly different sceptical 
positions. Indeed, some of the scholars who describe themselves as ‘sceptics’, or ‘anti-realists’, or 
‘instrumentalists’, actually hold positions extremely close to my own. This sounds backward, but that 
is only because of a confusing use of labels in the relevant literature. It is also crucial for me to engage 
with the so-called ‘scientific realism debate’. I actually do not consider this book a stance in the 
scientific realism debate, since that is a debate most usually defined by a particular distinction 
between ‘observables’ and ‘unobservables’, which will not matter much here, and which I believe to 
be unfortunate. At the same time, I do wish to argue against the proclamations of many ‘anti-realists’ 
or ‘non-realists’ (including Wray, Stanford, and Van Fraassen). 
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 Following the philosophical groundwork of Chapter 2 we move on to various case studies from 
both the history of science and also contemporary science. Chapter 3 is the first of the historical case 
studies. It concerns J. F. Meckel’s 1811-1827 novel predictive success concerning the existence of gill 
slits in the mammalian (including human) embryo. It is argued that this successful prediction, whilst 
prima facie impressive, only modestly confirmed Meckel’s theory of recapitulation. This demonstrates 
that there is no clear link between novel predictive success and truth, even if novel predictive success 
can sometimes be extremely influential as a type of first-order evidence. 
Chapter 4 continues the story of novel predictive success as a candidate example of highly 
persuasive first-order evidence. Whilst Chapter 3 shows that novel predictive success cannot always 
be relied upon as a hallmark of future-proof science, Chapter 4 argues further that novel predictive 
success can be rather insignificant evidentially speaking, even when it appears very significant. It does 
this via a discussion of a relatively recent novel predictive success of the theory of evolution, one that 
has been selected by contemporary scientists as a significant piece of evidence for the theory: the 
2004 discovery of the ‘missing link’ fossil Tiktaalik. Chapter 4 argues that it is much better to direct 
attention away from individual successes such as this, and towards the full body of evidence. Whilst 
the full body of evidence is in-practice inaccessible, even to senior experts in the field, it is argued that 
the weight of evidence can be judged indirectly via a consideration of certain features of the relevant 
scientific community. This marks a turning point in the book, with future-proof science being identified 
via second-order, not first-order, evidence. 
If we really turn away from first-order scientific evidence we must ask ourselves afresh: why do 
we firmly believe various scientific claims, such as the 30 examples listed in the previous section? The 
answer seems to be that we trust in scientific community opinion. Thus in Chapter 5 we start to ask 
the question: under what circumstances is scientific community opinion a hallmark of future-proof 
science? This leads to another historical case study, this time concerning a case where scientific 
community opinion apparently got it wrong: the case of continental drift 1915-1965. It was supposedly 
proven impossible for the continents to move; many scientists believed this result, and thus 
continental drift research was ridiculed and otherwise inhibited or suppressed. Does this mean that 
scientific community opinion cannot be confidently linked to future-proof science? Chapter 5 analyses 
the continental drift case and argues that it can be so-linked, but we need to carefully identify 
sufficiently strong cases of scientific consensus. Put briefly, I require a solid scientific consensus 
amounting to at least 95%, in a scientific community that is large, international, and diverse. 
Chapter 6 addresses Hoefer’s (2020) concern that, when it comes to fundamental physics, there 
is a “special vulnerability to underdetermination”, demanding significantly greater epistemic caution 
compared with other scientific contexts. Indeed, Hoefer’s argument would suggest that, when it 
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comes to ‘future-proof science’, one ought to treat fundamental physics as a very special case, 
completely blocking all pertinent claims, not because they are not future-proof, but because one can’t 
be sure. Chapter 6 starts by demonstrating the problem via a discussion of Sommerfeld’s 1916 
prediction of the hydrogen fine-structure spectral lines, based on a radically false theory of the atom. 
It is agreed that there are special epistemic problems in this context, but Hoefer’s particular way 
of drawing the distinction – contrasting ‘physics’ and ‘fundamental physics’ – is shown to be 
problematic: for one thing, the concept fundamental can’t bear the weight Hoefer wishes to place 
upon it. Alternative options are considered, including Van Fraassen’s (1980) observable/unobservable 
distinction. But in the end it is argued that any such epistemic distinction will always be too crude, too 
sweeping. Instead we do better to trust the relevant scientific community – who are already highly 
cautious in this context – to decide on a case by case basis. Thus it is argued that the criteria for future-
proof science introduced in Chapter 5 are also reliable in the context of ‘fundamental physics’ (broadly 
construed), and no special caveat is needed. 
 At this point in the book the link between scientific community opinion and future-proof science 
has been argued. But there are holes yet to fill in, and these come to the fore when we attempt to 
apply the proffered theory of future-proof science to contemporary cases. In Chapter 7 we turn to one 
of the most intriguing hypotheses of recent decades: the asteroid impact theory of the extinction of 
the dinosaurs. Many scientists have been tempted to state the hypothesis as a fact, and in 2010 a 
review article was published in Science hinting at a scientific consensus. There was a significant 
community reaction against this piece, however. In addition, there has been plenty of opposition to 
the claim in both the published literature and activity at (some) major conferences, all the way through 
from 1980 to 2020. This chapter navigates some of the challenges that can arise when we ask after 
the strength of feeling in the relevant scientific community vis-à-vis a specific claim. The case carries 
important lessons for how scientists go about declaring a consensus of opinion, a matter of crucial 
importance if – as this book argues – we are to identify future-proof science via sufficiently strong 
scientific consensus. 
 Chapter 8 applies the proffered theory of future-proof science to another contemporary case, this 
time of great social importance. During the Covid-19 pandemic, billions of people urgently wanted, 
and needed, answers to questions concerning scientific knowledge. Were all of the deaths definitely 
linked via a viral cause? Did it definitely originate in China in December 2019? Were the vast majority 
of children really safe? Could the vaccines be trusted? One thing lacking was a clear account of how 
the individual (whether expert or non-expert) could identify the future-proof scientific claims (the 
‘facts’), distinguishing them from other types of scientific claim, such as ‘promising hypotheses’, or 
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‘useful speculations’. Looking to the criteria for future-proof science put forward in this book, a worry 
arises that nothing scientists were saying, in 2020, about the pandemic, could responsibly be called 
‘future-proof’, since in 2020 so little time had passed for relevant scientific claims to be internationally 
scrutinized. But scientists did in fact have some relevant future-proof knowledge, even only a handful 
of weeks after the onset of the pandemic. This chapter explains how this is possible, given that usually 
absolute confidence in scientific claims depends upon extensive international scrutiny, often taking 
many years. 
Chapter 9 articulates my final proposal for identifying future-proof science. It draws on the lessons 
from all the previous chapters to lay out (i) the criteria for future-proof science, (ii) the core argument 
supporting these criteria, and (iii) a workable strategy for actually identifying future-proof science. I 
build on the ‘externalist’ suggestion put forward by Oreskes (2019) that the best strategy is to use 
certain tools to critically assess the status of the scientific consensus, as a proxy for evaluating the 
entire wealth of first-order evidence from a large number of different perspectives. The shift from 
‘internal’ evidence to ‘external’ evidence supports calls for adjustments to science education in our 
schools, with greater emphasis on teaching the ‘external’, second-order, or ‘sociological’ evidence for 
scientific claims. Additionally, this chapter raises some possible, outstanding objections, and provides 
preliminary responses. 
